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1. Introduction
This text has the aim of describing migration to East Central Europe aswell as migration policies of the new EU member states1 by using
a borderland framework. Focusing on borders and the space these borders
divide does not only add a new scientific perspective as is expressed in the
new terms of a “topographical” or “spatial turn”2.
Rediscovering the space of Central Eastern Europe is also an examina-
tion of open or tacit prejudices by political actors, populations, and among
them scholars. They do not necessarily have to belong to ‘the West’. In
a 2005 paper for the UN Population Division in the Department of Eco-
nomic and Social Affairs, two Polish authors did their best to confirm
a derogative image of East Central Europe3. According to them, the region
is marked by “relative economic and institutional backwardness (com-
pared to the West); a relative abundance of labor; relative instability of
state boundaries; relative instability of an ethnic mix in the population”. In
themselves, these “historical factors”4 can of course hardly be denied.
Much, however, depends on the point of reference. In the Habsburg Em-
pire, both the openness of borders and ethnic diversity were rather seen as
1 Which are: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland,
Slovakia, and Slovenia (accession round of May 2004) as well as Bulgaria and Roma-
nia (EU entry: January 2007).
2 Respectively: S. Weigel, Zum “topographical turn”. Kartographie, Topogra-
phie und Raumkonzepte in den Kulturwissenschaften, “KulturPoetik” 2002, vol. 2, no. 2,
p. 151–165; C. Rumford, Theorizing Borders, “European Journal of Social Theory”
2006, vol. 9, no. 2, p. 166.
3 P. Kaczmarczyk, M. Okólski, International Migration in Central and Eastern
Europe – Current and Future Trends, United Nations (UN/POP/PD/2005/12), New
York 2005, p. 6.
4 Ibidem.
resources than as defects5. Also, a global comparative perspective on East
Central Europe will readjust the all too general verdict of the region’s
backwardness.
The aim of our text is thus twofold. On the one hand, we try to map and
make sense of migration flows into and out of the new EU member states
and state reactions to them. On the other, we ask what these population
movements can tell us about the image of East Central Europe as a border-
land in the newly evolving European political order.
In order to reach these two aims, the borderland concept is referred to
as a metaphoric entity. There is no firmly established definition. Rather,
the term is used as an umbrella for a series of border related phenomena6:
the openness or closedness of borders, the interaction intensity across bor-
ders, the differential development on both sides of a border, the political
and social handling of borders, in general border policies. Accordingly,
the borderland question can not simply be reduced to the tension between
open and securitized borders7.
Instead, borderlands are implicitly connected to a “double peripherality”8
which locates an area “in the geographic periphery of the country, in close
proximity to the border, within which the residents of the region suffer
from economic, social and political peripherality in terms of their eco-
nomic status or their access to the power elites and decision-makers“9. In
that sense, the borderland concept falls into line with the popular image of
East Central Europe as an underprivileged or bluntly backward region. It
remains to be seen to what extent this blueprint is able to change with the
process of European integration10.
The text is organized in the following way. In the next section, we pres-
ent basic data on legal/work/family and asylum migration to East Central
Europe and try to interpret these against the context of historic develop-
ments and transition challenges. Afterwards, we focus on state reactions to
6 Christiane Barnickel, Timm Beichelt SP 4 ’11
5 E. Hobsbawm, The age of Empire, 1875–1914, First Vintage Books, New York 1989.
6 D. Newman, Borders and Bordering: Towards an Interdisciplinary Dialogue,
“European Journal of Social Theory” 2006, vol. 9, no. 2, p. 181.
7 C. Rumford, op. cit., p. 157.
8 J. House, The Frontier Zone: A Conceptual Problem for Policy Makers, “Inter-
national Political Science Review” 1980, vol. 1, p. 456–477.
9 D. Newman, op. cit., p. 180.
10 E. Bort, Integrated Borderlands?, in: Borders and security governance. Man-
aging borders in a globalized world, eds. M. Caparini, O. Marenin, LIT, Münster
2006, p. 190–213.
these migration flows with special attention to the interconnectivity of na-
tional policies and the process of European integration, notably on devel-
opments in the third pillar of the EU11 and with regard to the Schengen
agreement. In the last section, we come back to the borderlands image of
East Central Europe. In a tentative conclusion, we try to argue that the re-
gion is transforming from an outer to an inner borderland, turning the for-
merly peripheral region into a middle position, between an area with high
migration pressure and the even more attractive migration target states in
Western Europe. In the end then, East Central Europe should not be re-
duced to specific images originating in the West but be seen as a region
with a specific status in the context of global migration flows.
2. Migration to and from East Central Europe
2.1. The background: transition challenges, historic legacies,
and population setting
In accounts of contemporary history, Central Eastern Europe in the be-
ginning of the 21st century serves as a transformational geographic region
in several terms. First, it is far from consensual where the borders of Cen-
tral Eastern Europe are to be determined. In some respects, the region is
still accounted for as Eastern Europe because auf a common Slavic heri-
tage which begins east of Germany, Austria, and Italy. Also alternative
cultural categories play a role, for example the orthodox tradition or feel-
ings of belonging to a non-Western European tradition. These distinctions
do not subsume the entire region of Central Eastern Europe but rather in-
troduce dividing lines within the territory between ‘the West’ on the one
hand and ‘Russia’, as well as ‘Turkey’, on the other12.
Apart from cultural institutions, long established socio-economic as-
criptions have also started to crumble. This is the second point. Not even
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11 We are aware of the fact that the three pillar model has lost much of its descrip-
tive potential after the entering into force of the Lisbon Treaty. Nevertheless, it be-
comes clear that we are dealing with the area of freedom, security and justice.
However, most of our data refer to the pre-Lisbon setting and thus to the third pillar.
12 E.g. T. G. Masaryk, Russische Geistes- und Religionsgeschichte. 2 Bände (Original-
titel: Rußland und Europa. Studien über die geistigen Strömungen in Russland),
Eichborn, Frankfurt 1992 (1913).
a decade ago, also an unsuspicious scholar like Andrew Janos did not hesi-
tate to insist on the multi-dimensional “backwardness” of East Central
Europe; what he meant were lower degrees of economic development, an ex-
tensive agrarian societal structure, clientelistic instead of ‘Weberian’ rational
state administrations and an inferior infrastructure13. The lack of neutrality of
the backwardness notion has already been discussed. There is another point,
however – the perceived similarity or even homogeneity of the region. After
Janos, the mainstream of communist studies has shifted towards the distinc-
tions, not the similarities, of the cases concerned14. In the just cited literature,
even the largely Moscow-led communist regimes are discussed according to
their dissimilarities. Post-communist developments then lead into an even
more heterogeneous landscape. Some post-communist states have seen ex-
tensive economic growth, others haven’t. Some cases are characterized by el-
ements of societal consensus and a consociational approach, others are the
object of societal discontent or – in the 1990s – of ethnic wars. In societal
terms, the mere declaration of a region called ‘Central Eastern Europe’ puts
more questions on the table than there are answers15.
Table 1
Population composition in East Central Europe
(1)
Total
Population
(=100.0%)
(2)
Nationals
(3)
Other EU
Nationals
(4)
Non-EU
Nationals
1 2 3 4 5
Bulgaria (2001) 7,928,901 7,903,267
(99.7%)
3,685
(0.0%)
15,882
(0.2%)
Czech Republic (2007) 10,287,189 9,990,953
(97.1%)
102,884
(1.0%)
193,352
(1.9%)
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13 A. C. Janos, East Central Europe in the Modern World. The Politics of the Bor-
derland from Pre- to Postcommunism, Stanford University Press, Stanford 2000.
14 R. East, J. Pontin, Revolution and Change in Central and Eastern Europe,
Pinter, London 1997; H. Kitschelt, Z. Mansfeldova, R. Markowski u.a., Post-Com-
munist Party Systems. Competition, Representation, and Inter Party Cooperation,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999; R. Sakwa, Postcommunism, Open Uni-
versity Press, Buckingham 1999.
15 T. G. Ash, Zehn Jahre danach, “Transit” 1999/2000, no. 18, p. 5–16; K. Schlögel,
Soziokulturelle Wandlungsprozesse in Osteuropa: Leben in der Übergangsgesell-
schaft, in: Politische und ökonomische Transformation in Osteuropa. 3. Auflage, ed.
G. Brunner, Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, Berlin 2000, p. 233–252.
1 2 3 4 5
Estonia (2006) 1,344,684* 1,076,458
(80.1%)
7,067**
(0.5%)
100,729
(7.5%)
Hungary (2007) 10,066,158 9,900,128
(98.4%)
32,970
(0.3%)
133,060
(1.3%)
Latvia (2006) 2,294,590 1,837,832
(80.0%)
5,490
(0.2%)
450,996
(19.7%)
Lithuania (2006) 3,403,284 3,370,422
(99.0%)
1,916
(0.1%)
30,946
(0.9%)
Poland (2006) 38,125,479 38,070,596
(99.9%)
22,677
(0.0%)
32,206
(0.0%)
Romania (2006) 21,610,213 21,584,220
(99.9%)
n.a. 25,993
(0.1%)
Slovak Republic (2006) 5,389,180 5,363,617
(99.5%)
14,041
(0.3%)
11,522
(0.2%)
Slovenia (2006) 2,003,358 1,954,390
(97.6%)
2,540
(0.1%)
46,428
(2.3%)
* Number of total population – source Estonian Statistics. Because the Estonian Ministry of The
Interior Population Registration Bureau provides data on the basis of valid residence permits and
ID-cards (passports), the number of total population does not unify.
** Number of valid residence permits at the beginning of the year.
Source: European Migration Network (various publications, around 2008)16.
Third, political developments have challenged the idea of Central East
European homogeneity. The major issue is, of course, European integra-
tion and the successive EU membership of most countries concerned. In
1998, the EU opened membership negotiations with five countries17, putt-
ing pressure on neighboring countries this side of the Russian border. The
first wave of Eastern enlargement in 2004 thus contained eight Central Eu-
ropean States18. Bulgaria and Romania followed in 2007. Additionally, in
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16 All sources: European Migration Network (2008), http://emn.sarenet.es. There:
Bulgaria National Report 2006, Annual Report on Asylum and Migration Statistics for
the Czech Republic 2006, Estonian Migration and Asylum Statistics Report 2006, An-
nual Report on Asylum and Migration Statistics for Hungary (Reference Year: 2006),
Annual Report on Asylum and Migration Statistics for Latvia (Reference Year: 2006),
Lithuania. Annual Report 2004-05 Data, Annual Report on Asylum and Migration
Statistics Poland (Reference Year: 2006), Romania Annual Report 2004-05 Data, Slo-
vak Republic Annual Report 2004-05 Data, Slovenia Annual Report 2004-05 Data.
17 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia.
18 Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and
Slovenia.
2000, the EU explicitly declared the Western Balkan19 a potential EU
membership region and consecutively established associational rules
which – at least in principle – differ from EU policy towards its other
neighborhoods20.
Both association and enlargement processes have strongly touched mi-
gration regimes between East, Southeast, East Central and Western Eu-
rope. Visa free travel is one point, legal labor migration another21. Student
mobility through the Socrates/Erasmus program has been extended be-
yond the EU border and today includes countries, who, in the long run are
unlikely to become EU members.
As important as these threefold transition processes are, they have to be
seen against developments and settings from before the post-communist
period as well. The most important element consists in the late political
nation-building in the region which is connected to the age of the Russian,
Austrian-Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. Most nation states in the region
were formed after 1918 only, and independence lasted only until the late
1930s.
Moreover, the breakup of Habsburg notably led to a patchwork of na-
tionalities within the newly created states. Internal – and sometimes
forced – migration within the Soviet Union augmented the size of Russian
minorities in the Baltic States. As a result, in most East Central European
states we know today of regions where a minority population outnumbers
that of the titular nation22. Within the region, different citizenship regimes
influence the character of migration across borders. Notably Estonia and
Latvia have introduced comparatively restrictive naturalization proce-
dures for ethnic Russians23 whereas all other countries have by and large
granted citizenship to their respective minorities.
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19 Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and (today)
Montenegro. Negotiations with Croatia came to an end in 2011 and accession is ex-
pected around summer 2013.
20 Partner oder Beitrittskandidaten? Die Nachbarschaftspolitik der Europäischen
Union auf dem Prüfstand, eds. M. Koopmann, Ch. Lequesne, Nomos, Baden-Baden 2006.
21 There are a number of transitional arrangements concerning the mobility of la-
bor within the enlarged EU.
22 Minority Rights in the ‘New’ Europe, eds. P. Cumper, S. Wheatley, Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, London–Boston 1999. Exceptions are Poland, the Czech Republic,
Slovakia, and Slovenia.
23 V. Poleshchuk, National Integration in Estonia and Latvia: 2000–2002, ECMI
Report 46, ed. European Centre for Minority Issues, Flensburg 2003.
The two background conditions which have just been described lead to
peculiar population settings. First, the dissolution of Empires, and later,
the breakup of historic artifacts like the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and
Czechoslovakia led to numerous new states in the region. As table 1
shows, all but two of them have much less inhabitants than New York City.
Citizenship policies are reflected in the fact that in Estonia and Latvia
larger parts of the population do not have a regular citizenship of the titular
state. However, these non-citizens are usually furnished with permanent
residence permits which makes it hard to see them as migrants. In their
case, the pertinent policy field consists in citizenship and integration pol-
icy and less in migration policy.
Table 2
Overview on migration flows in new EU member states
Total Popu-
lation24
(thousands)
Migrant Stock
Net migration (annual aver-
age, 2000–2005)
Number
(thousands)
% of popu-
lation
Number
(thousands)
Net migration
(rate per 1.000
population)
Bulgaria 7,726 104 1.3 –10 –1.0
Czech Republic 10,220 453 4.4 10 1.0
Estonia 1,330 202 15.2 –2 –1.5
Hungary 10,098 316 3.1 10 1.0
Latvia 2,307 449 19.5 –2 –1.0
Lithuania 3,431 165 4.8 –4 –1.2
Poland 38,530 703 1.8 –16 –0.4
Romania 21,711 133 0.6 –30 –1.4
Slovak Republic 5,401 124 2.3 1 0.2
Slovenia 1,967 167 8.5 2 1.0
Source: UN Report, International Migration 2006.
Not least because of their history of half a century of closed borders,
most of the states in East Central Europe then are confronted with a com-
paratively low migration stock of usually well below 5% (table 2). If EU
citizens within this migration stock are accounted for, the number is even
lower. When discussing migration flows, we therefore have to take note of
a phenomenon with an ultimately limited relevance for overall policy-making.
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24 Due to different data sources, the figures differ slightly from those in table 1.
2.2. Migration Flows
Within the limited scope of migration, numbers are however rising.
Graph 1 considers real migration flows and therefore views ethnic minori-
ties – for example in the Baltics – as a virtual migration stock. If this caveat
is made, the graph indicates that the big economic centers of Central Eu-
rope attract the highest degree of migration in the region. Although Poland
and Romania are by territory and population the largest countries of the re-
gion, they attract very limited numbers of immigrants, often well below
10.000 per year. In contrast, the Czech Republic and Hungary with their
capitals Prague and Budapest draw in more relevant numbers. As we
know from other sources25, most of these are migrant workers and do not
belong to potential other categories like family, student, or asylum migra-
tion. This is highly plausible as the Prague, Bratislava and Budapest re-
gions are the only ones in the new EU member countries which are not
objects of aid by EU structural funds26. The growing economic attractive-
ness of the region, fuelled by an investment climate in anticipation of the
European Common Market, is also reflected in growing numbers of mi-
gration from year to year. Except for Romania – the poorest economy of
the region – this tendency holds in every new EU member state.
Migration flows into economically prosperous regions are not very
surprising. Still, they deserve a second look in the case of East Central Eu-
rope. As a region which is historically marked by agrarianism, internal
center/periphery relations are marked by big differences. During the trans-
formation, and despite the beginning of the flow of EU structural funds
a few years ago, disparities within East Central Europe have grown27.
Accordingly, migration does not only take place by foreigners in the big
centers and capitals. There is a corresponding domestic migration and,
moreover, a considerable emigration out of some countries. Graph 2
shows that the three Baltic States as well as Bulgaria, Poland, Romania
have been confronted with negative migration flows in recent years.
12 Christiane Barnickel, Timm Beichelt SP 4 ’11
25 J. Salt, Demographic Challenges for Social Cohesion, Paper presented to Euro-
pean population conference, EPC(2005)S3.1, Strasbourg 2005, p. 10.
26 See http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/atlas2007/index_en.htm; accessed 8.10.2009.
27 EBRD, Transition Report 2003. Integration and regional cooperation, European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London 2003; B. Lippert, G. Umbach, The
Pressure of Europeanisation. From post-communist state administrations to normal
players in the EU system, Nomos, Baden-Baden 2005.
Therefore, we have to account for a clear distinction between the
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovenia on the one hand and the Baltic
States plus Bulgaria and Romania on the other (in Poland and Slovakia im-
migration and emigration flows are by and large balanced). Due to a mix-
ture of domestic transition hardships and attenuating hurdles for
emigration into Western Europe, the latter have to be characterized as emi-
gration societies. The connection to economic potential is almost com-
pletely counter-intuitive – the higher average growth during the years
2000–2005, the lower the migration rate (again, see graph 2).
One explanation for the unexpected relation consists in differing abso-
lute economic power. If we do not take into account growth rates but GDP
levels, we find that relativity wealthy countries – Czech Republic, Hun-
gary, Slovenia28 – are faced with net immigration. Another explanation
can be found in an element of borderland regions which adds another di-
mension of peripherality to the two ones conceptualized by House (1980)29.
Peripherality does not only relate to the difference between a border re-
gion and a prosperous center. Also the borderland itself is structured in
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Graph 1. Migration to New EU Member States
Sources: European Migration Network (see table 1).
28 For the data, see EBRD, Transition Report 2008: Growth in transition, EBRD,
London 2008.
29 Ibidem.
a patchwork-like arrangement and offers significant disparities. Well de-
veloping knots of social and economic activity are surrounded by under-
developed and therefore remote regions.
Table 3
Legal Migration to New Member States of Non-EU Nationals
(1)
Total
population
(4)
Non-EU
Nationals
Country of Origin;
Total group size;
(% of Non-EU-Nationals)
1 2 3
1 2 3 4 5 6
Bulgaria (2001) 7,928,901 15,882
(0.2%)
Russia
9,427
(59.4%)
Ukraine
2,283
(24.2%)
Armenia
1649
(10.4%)
Czech Republic
(2007)
10,287,189 193,352
(1.9%)
Ukraine
86739
(44.9%)
Vietnam
38454
(19.9%)
Russia
17,216
(8.9%)
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Sources: UN Report ‘International Migration 2006’ and Eurostat. See http://epp.eurostat.ec.euro-
pa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init=1&plugin=1&language=de& pcode=tsieb020 (Accessed 18.09.2009).
1 2 3 4 5 6
Estonia (2006) 1,344,684* 236,729
(17.6%)
Citizenship
not determined
136,000
(57.4%)
Russia
93,027
(39.3%)
Ukraine
4,443
(1.9%)
Hungary (2007) 10,066,158 133,060
(1.3%)
Romania
66,951
(50.3%)
Ukraine
15,866
(11.9%)
Serbia and
Montenegro
12,638
(9.5%)
Latvia (2006) 2,294,590 450,996
(19.7%)
Citizenship
not determined
418,668
(92.8%)
Russia
25,353
(5.6%)
Ukraine
2,621
(0.6%)
Lithuania (2006) 3,403,284 30,946
(0.9%)
Russia
14,177
(45.8%)
Citizenship
not determined
8615
(27.8%)
Belarus 3,714
(12.0%)
Poland (2006) 38,125,479 32,206
(0.0%)
Ukraine 5,182
(16.1%)
Russia
3,291
(10.2%)
Vietnam 1,906
(5.9%)
Romania (2006) 21,610,213 25,993
(0.1%)
Moldova
5,459
(21.0%)
Turkey
2,188
(8.4%)
China
1,898
(7.3%)
Slovakia (2006) 5,389,180 11,522
(0.2%)
Ukraine
3,703
(32.1%)
Russia
1,246
(10.8%)
Vietnam 848
(7.4%)
Slovenia (2006) 2,003,358 46,428
(2.3%)
Bosnia and
Herzegov.
21,943
(47.3%)
Serbia and
Montenegro
9279
(20.0%)
Croatia
6,955
(15.0%)
* Number of total population– source Estonian Statistics Because of the Estonian Ministry of The
Interior Population Registration Bureau provides data on the bases of valid residence permits and
ID-cards (passports), the number of total population does not unify.
** Number of valid residence permits at the beginning of the year.
Source: European Migration Network (various publications, 2008).
One reason consists in the relative artificiality of borders in Central
Eastern Europe. Some economic magnets are not situated in a historic bor-
der region. For example, Bratislava is located some 60 km from Vienna
and has thus developed complementary to Vienna, the capital of the Haps-
burg Empire. Not even the completely closed border after 1945 has led to
a complete meltdown of economic and social capital of one of the main
economic hotspots of contemporary Central Europe. But we also find an-
other pattern, namely towns or regions prospering because of their prox-
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imity to the border. One example would be Riga, one of the major ports
for Russian exports. Another is the authors’ university town of Frank-
furt/Oder which receives an enormous input of social resources because
of its perceived bridge function in German-Polish relations30. In both
cases, the named towns can by far not be classified as wealthy as
Bratislava or Prague. Still, they stand out in comparison to their local
neighborhoods.
It must be noted that the migration flows presented in graph 2 present
net figures. Regardless of the net balance, every country in East Central
Europe is confronted with immigration. Since the next section will take
a look at state responses to this immigration, it is useful to analyze the ori-
gin of major migrant groups. Table 3 does so in concentrating on non-EU
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Graph 3. Asylum seekers in new EU member states31
Source: UNHCR, Statistical Yearbooks 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008, http://www.unhcr.org/pa-
ges/4a0174156.html (access: 22.09.2009).
30 R. Rottenburg, Classifications: Change or Fluidisation? A Phenomenological
Approach to a Liminal Dance Floor in Western Poland, Arbeitsberichte des FIT,
Frankfurt 1997; K. Schlögel, Soziokulturelle..., op. cit.
31 The sum refers to all 10 new EU member states from East Central Europe.
migration which is today the only migration that national immigration pol-
icies can relate to (of course, migration within the EU is part of the four
freedoms of the common market and can therefore float freely).
The evolving patterns hint into two directions. First, we find major ele-
ments of post-communist heritage in the composition of migration. The
most important group of non-EU migrants to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithua-
nia are Russians; this goes beyond the mere presence of Russian minori-
ties in all Baltic States. Data we have from Lithuania indicates that a good
proportion of the migration is family related migration32; an element
which should be still stronger in Estonia and Latvia, where the Russian
minorities are much more important. However, Russians in the Baltic
States are not the only issue. Also the significant weight of Romanians in
Hungary hints to a historic pattern as large parts of today’s Romania were
part of Hungary before the Treaty of Trianon (1920). The migration from
several successor states of Yugoslavia into Slovenia falls under similar
terms. Also, the migration of Vietnamese people into the Czech and Slo-
vak Republics has roots in international division of labor organized within
the Soviet bloc.
Second, a typical pattern of asymmetric migration relations can be ob-
served. Ukrainian migration notably to the economically richer countries
of the region – Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia – is a phenomenon
similar to the migration of Mexicans into the USA. Like in other countries
of the EU, Ukrainian labor migrants can be found in the hotel and restau-
rant sector, in formal and informal health care, in the construction and
cleaning businesses as well as in private home-related employment33. The
point has already been alluded to – certain regions of Central Eastern Eu-
rope are in the process of losing their peripheral character and are turning
into migration targets. With other words, the periphery is developing
socio-economic pull factors for migration.
This finding is also reflected in a further element, namely asylum mi-
gration. During the association and enlargement processes with the EU,
East Central European states undertook significant steps towards becom-
ing part of the inner-EU visa and asylum regime (see next section). This
basically means that the region has turned from a relatively pure transit re-
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32 J. Salt, Demographic..., op. cit., p. 10.
33 A. Chindea, M. Majkowska-Tomkin, H. Mattila u.a., Migration in Ukraine:
A Country Profile 2008, International Organization for Migration, Geneva 2008,
p. 20–24.
gion of refugees to harbor docks. Therefore, in most countries, the number
of asylum seekers has generally been rising during the last two decades
(see graph 3). Again, two important developments can be discerned. One
is the vulnerability to major international crises, for example the wars in
Kosovo (1999) and Iraq (2001). Figures explode throughout the region
during both these conflicts, and again the richer countries are more attrac-
tive than, for example Bulgaria and Romania, which are placed on impor-
tant migration routes. The second is the continuing relevance of the region
for migrants around and after EU enlargement. Here, Poland as a classic
border region to the new periphery of Eastern Europe comes into focus;
the Bug River takes over the role the Oder River between Poland and Ger-
many played during the 1990s.
3. Migration policies in East Central Europe
What do we expect the migration policies of countries in East Central
Europe to look like? The previous section has shown that the region is
marked by considerable heterogeneity, notably with regard to long-term
historic experiences and to economic potential. While it seems plausible
that theses factors influence both the scope and the character of migration
to East Central Europe, it is hardly convincing to attribute patterns of mi-
gration policy to these factors alone. Beyond the individual setting of each
country case there are several context factors which make similarities be-
tween East Central European migration policies highly probable. This sec-
tion tries to take stock of them.
3.1 Introducing homogeneity: the influence of transformation
and European integration
With regard to migration and migration related political reactions, the
most basic political development consisted in a series of abrupt border
openings between early 1989 and late 1991. We remember pictures of
GDR citizens desperately trying to leave their country. Changes in border
regimes of other USSR satellite states were less spectacular but of similar
importance. The Round Table in Poland started in February 1989, leading
to a non-communist government and liberalized travel opportunities later
in the year. Hungary demilitarized its border during the summer of 1989.
Latecomers in this respect were the Baltic States which could not escape
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the Soviet – and particularly closed – border regime until after its collapse
between August and December 1991.
All border openings set free a considerable emigration potential34. Be-
cause of the region’s historical disadvantage in socio-economic terms, em-
igration to Western Europe and the United States had taken place long
before Communism. Consequently, there existed a retained emigration
potential beyond the hardships of post-communist transition35. The result-
ing family migration since 1989/91 is to be seen as a multi-directional
flow. There is migration in at least two directions, and few movements are
seen as final decisions. All this is in line with our general knowledge of
late-modern migration – neither emigration nor immigration are necessar-
ily of permanent nature, and processes are rather marked by networks and
transnational social spaces than by unidirectional vectors and completely
segmented societal groups36.
Another implication of transition consists in the diverse structure of
transition economies. The point, which has already been touched upon,
can be further clarified by looking at labor migration into transformation
states (graph 4). It shows the attractiveness of dynamic economic environ-
ments even in phases of rising unemployment in the migration target
country. New areas of economic activity demand qualifications which are
not necessarily present in a post-communist environment. Therefore, even
transition countries during the recession phase are in need of a labor immi-
gration policy for highly skilled workers. As graph 4 indicates, this is of
special relevance for those countries with a relatively high influx of for-
eign capital – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were the relevant
cases in the early phase of transition37. After EU enlargement became
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34 I. Oswald, Migrationssoziologie, UVK Verlagsgesellschaft, Konstanz 2007,
p. 143–147.
35 During a semi-private meeting in 2004, then-president of Poland Aleksander
Kwaœniewski expressed the view that there are “in fact 50 million Poles – 40 million on
native soil and 10 million in the USA”. In the same meeting, Kwaœniewski wondered if
Warsaw or Chicago should be seen as the “real capital of Poland”.
36 W. Schiffauer, Europa als transnationaler Raum – Perspektiven der kultur-
wissenschaftlichen Migrationsforschung, in: Europa-Studien. Eine Einführung, VS
Verlag für Sozialwissenschaft, eds. T. Beichelt, B. Choluj, G. Rowe u.a., Wiesbaden
2006, p. 95–110.
37 See, for example EBRD, Transition Report 1999. Ten Years of Transition, Euro-
pean Bank for Reconstruction and Development, London 1999.
a firm expectation, foreign investment rose considerably in all new EU
member states38.
When the perspective of European integration started to become real
for East Central European countries in the second half of the 1990s, the
idea of individual immigration policies became accompanied by a frame
of pan-European regimes. Indeed we have to think in several dimensions
as the EU politics were (and to some degree still are) highly fragmented in
the first decade after the Maastricht Treaty of 1991.
The first arena concerns labor migration. In the EC Treaty, the ability
to work in other EU member states was (and is) anchored as one of the four
famous ‘freedoms’ of goods, persons, capital and services. In practice
however, the implementation of the free movement of persons remains
perforated even today, mainly because labor market policy remains in
the competency of member states. With regard to the labor force of East
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38 EBRD, Transition Report 2008..., op. cit.
Central European States, the accession treaties introduced a number of
transitional rules. Mainly, they refer to restrictions to low skilled labor and
services for up to seven years after enlargement39. Many states of the
EU-15 opted for an early end to the transitional provisions after the Com-
mission offered evidence that they had produced net negative welfare ef-
fects on the side of the old member states40.
A second area concerns student migration. East Central European
countries were included in the Erasmus lifelong learning program of the
European Commission several years ago. According to data from the
Commission, between 1% and 1.5% of the student population of the fol-
lowing countries have migrated within the participant states during the ac-
ademic year 2007/08: Czech Republic (1.54%), Latvia, Estonia, and
Slovenia (1.03%)41. While the information does not sound impressive at
first, a second thought reveals a considerable potential for the establish-
ment of a transnational European student body. Since the numbers refer to
outgoing students by year, they have to be multiplied by years of study,
which raises the figure of students having studied in other EU member
states to around five to eight per cent, respectively. Additionally, not all in-
ternational students at European universities are participants in the Eras-
mus program. For example, more than 12% of the students at German
universities are non-nationals; some 9% are ‘real’ foreigners and another
3–4% are long-term German residents without citizenship, among them
significant student bodies from Central and Eastern Europe42. Perhaps
most important for these figures is that all cited numbers have been rising
significantly during the recent decade.
A third type of migration which is exposed to Europeanization – a notion
for the effect of EU policies on national political arenas43 – is related to visa
and asylum policy. The policy area has only gradually become a subject of the
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39 Information and further links can be found at http://europa.eu/legisla-
tion_sum-maries/internal_market/living_and_working_in_the_internal_market/free_mo-
vement_of_workers/l23013a_en.htm (accessed 30.09.2009).
40 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2006:0048:
FIN:EN:HTML (accessed 30.09.2009).
41 See http://ec.europa.eu/education/erasmus/doc/stat/table208.pdf (accessed 30.09.2009).
42 See http://www.wissenschaft-weltoffen.de/daten/1/1/3 (accessed 30.09.2009).
43 T. A. Börzel, T. Risse, Conceptualizing the Domestic Impact of Europe, in: The
Politics of Europeanization, eds. K. Featherstone, C. M. Radaelli, Oxford University
Press, Oxford 2003, p. 57–80.
EC and EU treaties44. At the same time, several institutions beyond the EU
play a major role, for example the Schengen agreement, international police
cooperation (Interpol and Europol) and the Council of Europe. Central Eu-
ropean states have been successively included in all these institutions.
Of central relevance is the participation in the Schengen information
system which allows for a common border regime. Contrary to earlier ex-
pectations, the new member states of East Central Europe were included
rather rapidly into the Schengen structures. Internal border controls on land
and sea routes were stopped shortly before Christmas 2007; passport control
at airports ceased a few months later. Since then, nine of the twelve new EU
member states of 2004/07 – namely the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia – are part of the
Schengen area which now accounts for about 400 million EU citizens45. For
the citizens of many third states, travelling to Estonia or Slovenia is there-
fore linked to a visa to the whole Schengen area46. In contrast, Bulgaria and
Romania (and Cyprus) will join the visa regime at a later stage.
The interpretation patterns around these three developments are well
known. On the one hand, the official praise that characterizes pertinent
public relations material by the Commission seems well deserved as long
as one examines EU internal developments. East Central Europe has be-
yond any doubt become closer to Western Europe; the iron curtain has
been replaced by bridges, gateways, and other means of transnational
interaction. Already, value orientations and attitudinal openness of the
citizens of East Central Europe are at similar levels as those in the long in-
tegrated countries of Western Europe47.
On the other hand, the external management of the EU borders is more
and more characterized by the mechanisms of securitization48. In that
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44 See T. Müller, Die Innen- und Justizpolitik der Europäischen Union. Eine Ana-
lyse der Integrationsentwicklung, Leske+Budrich, Opladen 2003.
45 http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/07/619&for-
mat= HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (accessed 8.10.2009).
46 At the moment, two EU states (Ireland and Great Britain) are only very loosely
linked to the Schengen regime. Bulgaria, Cyprus, and Romania only apply parts of the
Schengen regime but not the information system.
47 D. D. Laitin, Culture and National Identity: ‘The East’ and European Integra-
tion, in: The Enlarged European Union. Diversity and Adaption, eds. P. Mair,
J. Zielonka, Cass, London 2002, s. 55–80.
48 See, for example Reflective Approaches to European Governance, ed. K. E. Jor-
gensen, Macmillan, Houndsmills 1997.
sense, the growing freedoms of internal movement induce an ever tougher
and dispelling border regime which transforms questions of economic and
social interaction into matters of (internal and external) security policy.
Beyond normative aspects on how to judge a policy which produces a lot
of human pain, the effect for East Central European states is ambivalent in
another aspect. At the same time these countries found their independ-
ence, their state autonomy and state capacity were heavily circumcised.
This development has often been characterized as a process of alienation:
“Hence they are forced to close borders and patrol the boundaries of Eu-
rope on account of external political pressure rather than in response to
their own perceived needs”49.
While a more detailed description of migration and asylum policies of the
countries of Central Eastern Europe will follow in the next subsection, it can
already be stated here that empirical data to some extent rejects the assump-
tion that Europeanization in the area of freedom, security and justice – as the
EU now calls this policy-field officially – leads to a homogenization of asy-
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lum and visa policies. As graph 5 illustrates, the percentage of refusals of asy-
lum applications differs widely between the new member states.
Further data also allows a preliminary statement on the specific impact
of EU membership (as opposed to a general exposure to impulses from
Europe). Table 4 sets up a relation between first instance decisions on asy-
lum requests in 2003 – the last year before EU membership – and the first
quarter of 2009. There should be a homogeneity expectation. No big dif-
ferences between the cases should be expected if EU level developments
presumably determine the closedness or openness of a country. Also, de-
grees of closedness should become more similar during the course of EU
membership if the securitization thesis applies.
Table 4
First instance decisions on asylum requests, first quarter 2009
Total
number
Positive
decisions
Rejections 2003 vs. 2009
Absolute
numbers
%
2003
%*
Difference
2003–09
Bulgaria n.a. n.a. 65 n.a. 70.7% n.a.
Czech Republic n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 97.7% n.a.
Estonia 10 0 5 50.0% 100.0% –50.0
Hungary 390 90 300 77.0% 44.9% +31.5
Latvia 15 0 15 100.0% 45.5% +54.5
Lithuania 70 30 40 57.1% 52.7% +4.4
Poland 1,695 1,100 595 35.1% 92.9% –57.8
Romania 205 40 165 80,5% 90.5% –10.0
Slovak Republic 45 35 10 22.2% 97.5% –75.3
Slovenia 45 0 45 100.0% 81.7% +18.3
* Data is taken from graph 5.
Source: A. Albertinelli, P. Juchno, Population and Social Conditions – Asylum applicants and de-
cisions on asylum applications in Q1 2009, Eurostat, Brussels 2009 (Data in Focus 30/2009), p.7.
The data in table 4 seem to imply that the assumption is wrong. There
are important differences between the new member states on how they
handle the asylum issue, be there a growing basis for a common asylum
policy or not. And, as the examples of Estonia, Poland and Slovakia show,
differences between the cases may even grow over time. All three cases’
position on the long Russian, Belarusian and Ukrainian borders would
make them clear cases for a decrease of openness for asylum seekers. In-
stead, the data from graph 5 and table 4 indicate that the asylum policies of
those countries seemingly have become more permissive over time.
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3.2. Patterns of migration policy
Shortly after the breakdown of the Soviet Union most of the newly in-
dependent states manifested their will to join the European Union, leading
to political adjustments in order to fulfill the membership criteria laid
down at the Copenhagen summit in 1993. In the aftermath of negotiation
openings in 1997, the prospective member states not only had to meet the
economic and political criteria but also to adapt domestic legislation to the
European acquis communautaire. Thus, bringing in-line domestic laws
with European Union requirements was part of the agenda, including also
policies on immigration50. Hence, significant EU influence on domestic
decision-making should be expected.
Migration policies in many Central and Eastern European Countries
have been, and to some extend still are, described as comparatively inco-
herent, lacking clearly defined aims and objectives51. However, in light of
the previous sections and in view of the aforementioned changes in the in-
ternational context, at least two tendencies should be expected. First, it can
be assumed that migration policies in CEE countries eventually mirror the
respective economic situation. Second, an increasing interest in managing
illegal migration may well be expected. Both could be read as a conse-
quence of dealing with socio-economic developments during and after
transition, and the aim to become a member state of the European Union.
The latter also is likely to have forced East Central European countries to
adopt specific measures in the field of border controls, asylum and visa
policies. If these expectations are reflected in the policies adopted, the im-
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50 Concerning migration policies, competences situated on supranational level are first
and foremost motivated by the removal of internal borders, resulting in the need for com-
mon policies regulating Asylum and Visa. Thus, migration policy in this context has to be
understood also in the context of internal security and managing effectively EU-external
borders (cf. S. Lavenex, Europäische Union. Focus Migration, Länderprofil Europäische
Union 2009). Recently, discussions about what in EU jargon is called the external dimen-
sion of Justice and Home Affairs are gaining weight (on the external dimension of Justice
and Home Affairs see S. Wolff, N. Wichmann, G. Mounier, The External Dimension of
Justice and Home Affairs: A Different Security Agenda for the EU?, “Journal of European
Integration” 2009, vol. 31, no. 1, p. 9–23) Concerning labor migration the EU has not yet
defined common standards; exceptions are two directives on admission of students and re-
searchers respectively (S. Lavenex, op. cit., p. 5).
51 Cf. D. Drbohlav, Immigration and the Czech Republic (with a special focus on the
Foreign Labor Force), “International Migration Review” 2003, vol. 37, no. 1, p. 213;
S. Alscher, Polen. Focus Migration, Länderprofil Polen 2008, p. 2.
age of East Central Europe as borderland and the notions associated with
the region as a European borderland region are very likely to be subject to
a significant process of transformation (see below).
In order to map the field, we need to distinguish between several di-
mensions of migration policy. First, the prospects of citizenship and natu-
ralization will be considered, followed by a paragraph on Visa and
Asylum Policies. In a next step we look at policies on illegal migration as
well as related spheres of activity like border control and readmission. The
last section on Labor Migration Policies is included as we expect the poli-
cies to reflect the economic situation of the respective state. In general, we
aim not at giving a detailed overview of each policy in every single state,
but rather to filter out general tendencies.
3.2.1. Citizenship and Naturalization – refocusing the nation
In recent years most of CEE countries modified legislation on citizen-
ship and residence permits, on the whole seeming to reflect a trend to-
wards establishing stricter measures. For instance, in the Czech Republic
a language test for permanent residence applicants has been introduced in
200752. Once having lived in the country for five years under permitted per-
manent residence status (and ten years holding a visa before) immigrants
can apply for naturalization. Quicker access to permanent residence permits
is granted to high skilled workers, who consequently can apply for natural-
ization more rapidly53. Foreigners applying for naturalization in Estonia
have inter alia to fulfill the requirement of previous permanent residence
and to prove their basic knowledge of Estonian language and constitution54.
For being eligible for Lithuanian citizenship applicants are required to
have held a permanent residence permit for ten years, to pass a language
test and to verify financial means55. In Poland previous temporal residence
of five years as well as sufficient financial means are required in order to
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52 OECD, International Migration Outlook: SOPEMI, OECD, Paris 2008, p. 236.
53 V. Slykalikova, Der Einfluss des EU-Beitritts auf die tschechische Integrations-
und Migrationspolitik, in: Die Transformation nationaler Politik. Europäisierung-
sprozess in Mitteleuropa, eds. C. Slimi-Asl, E. Wrasse, G. Schuch, DGAP-Schriften
zur nationalen Politik, Berlin 2005, p. 266, 270.
54 European Migration Network, Estonian Migration and Asylum Statistics Report
2006, 2008, p. 28ff.
55 B. Brake, Litauen. Focus Migration, Länderprofil Litauen 2007, p. 3.
be qualified for permanent residence since 200356. Naturalization policies
in the Slovak Republic are turning out to be stricter by raising the required
period of continuous residence and testing knowledge skills more strictly57.
In the case of Romania, it is interesting to note that an exception in the nat-
uralization procedure is granted to entrepreneurs investing to a significant
degree in Romania. Usually, the period one has to live in the country before
being allowed to apply for citizenship is eight years, in their case the required
time span can be shortened58. This measure presumably points to the ten-
dency to connect migration policy to the countries’ economic development.
Additionally, many CEE countries are encouraging return migration or
at least have done so in recent years. The Czech Republic conducted a pro-
gram to encourage the return of ethnic Czechs by offering incentives like
financial assistance for accommodation as well as permanent residence
permits between 1995 and 200159. Similarly, Hungary, where ethnic Hun-
garians returning from the neighborhood account for the largest part of im-
migrants60, introduced legislation facilitating the naturalization of ethnic
Hungarians from neighboring countries61. Return migration is increasing
also in Romania, along with the encouragement of return migration being
a declared goal of Romanian migration policy62. The law on repatriation
adopted in 2002 regulates return migration to Poland and defines the crite-
ria to be fulfilled. Since 2008 the Karta Polaka grants certain advantages
like access to the labor market without holding a work permit to ethnic
Poles who are returning from successor States of the Soviet Union63.
3.2.2. Visa and Asylum – adaptation to the European framework
After the breakdown of the Soviet Union the respective policies on
visa and asylum somewhat differed between the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe. For example, while the Czech Republic was character-
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56 S. Alscher, op. cit., p. 4.
57 OECD, International Migration Outlook..., op. cit., p. 276.
58 I. Horvath, Rumänien. Focus Migration, Länderprofil Rumänien, 2007, p. 5.
59 V. Slykalikova, op. cit., p. 265.
60 European Migration Network, Annual Report on Asylum and Migration Statis-
tics for Hungary (Reference Year 2006), 2008, p. 11.
61 OECD, International Migration Outlook..., op. cit., p. 248.
62 Ibidem, p. 274; I. Horvath, op. cit., p. 8.
63 S. Alscher, op. cit., p. 2f.
ized by open borders64, Lithuanian immigration policy has been quite re-
strictive, especially vis-à-vis citizens from the former Soviet Union. The
intention of this restrictiveness is mainly seen in the aim to foster inde-
pendence65. In the Czech Republic asylum policy became more restrictive
after the Balkan wars, moreover ‘Asylum Tourism’ caused by the open
borders led to a policy-shift66. Until the adoption and entry into force
(1997 and 1998 respectively) of the First Hungarian Asylum Act, Hun-
gary solely accepted refugees from European countries67. With Latvia rat-
ifying the Geneva Conventions in July 1997 all of the new member states
of the European Union are now contracting parties68.
Accession to the European Union implied the adaptation of national
law to the acquis communautaire in the area of asylum. Subsequent
changes were dependant on existing legislation and the fit or misfit with
EU requirements. Most new member states had to introduce a further cate-
gory into asylum legislation, which implies tolerating refugees without
(yet) accepting them for asylum status but neither expulsing them to their
respective countries of origin69.
Furthermore, new member states are requested to implement technolo-
gies as the Eurodac system for comparing fingerprints of asylum seekers
and illegal migrants employed within the European Union70. Estonia, for
example, regulated the fingerprint system in 200671. Additionally, as they
form the fringe area of the European Union, several new member states
can be expected to increasingly become target states of asylum seekers
and refugees. According to Council Regulation (EC) No. 343/2003 re-
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64 V. Slykalikova, op. cit., p. 265.
65 B. Brake, op. cit., p. 4.
66 V. Slykalikova, op. cit., p. 257, 265.
67 European Migration Network, Bulgaria National Report 2006, 2008b, p. 1.
68 Hungary ratified in 1989, followed by Poland and Romania in 1991, Slovenia
(1992), Bulgaria, the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic (1993) and finally Estonia,
Latvia and Lithuania (1997) (See: www.unhcr.at/fileadmin/unhcr_data/pdfs/recht-
sinformationen/1_International/1_Voelkerrechtliche_Dokumente/01_GFK/04_Liste_der_
Vertragsstaaten.pdf).
69 For instance, Estonia introduced temporary protection in 2006 (European Migra-
tion Network, Estonian Migration..., op. cit., p. 4), Poland established an equivalent
category in 2003 (B. Brake, op. cit., p. 6), the Slovak Republic in 2007 (OECD, Inter-
national Migration Outlook..., op. cit., p. 276).
70 On Eurodac system see http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_free-
dom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigration/l33081_en.htm.
71 European Migration Network, Estonian Migration..., op. cit., p. 9.
sponsibility for Asylum applications lies in the hands of the member state
an asylum seeker enters first. Owing to this provision and the anticipated
rise in the number of refugees and asylum seekers Romania has built up
new accommodation centers for asylum applicants72.
Similarly, visa policy had to be adapted to the European regulatory
framework, not least since the entry into the Schengen zone. In the context
of EU accession most of the new member states had to introduce visa re-
quirements, often affecting citizens of neighboring countries who were
previously not subject to visa requirements. For example, in order to be
in-line with the negative Schengen list Bulgaria had to finalize visa-free
agreements with e.g. Georgia, the Russian Federation and Ukraine73.
Likewise, Poland introduced visa requirements for the citizens of Belarus,
the Russian Federation and Ukraine inter alia and had to finalize agree-
ments on facilitated border crossing74. The visa-free travel between the
Slovak Republic and Ukraine came to an end in June 2000, when the Slo-
vak Republic introduced visa requirements in order to comply with the
Schengen requirements75. Taking a closer look at the relationship between
Romania and Moldova, implications of the obligation to introduce visa re-
quirements become even more obvious: In the context of EU-accession
Romania established visa for Moldovan citizens, while previously a mo-
bility agreement (coming close to repatriation in the case of Romanian
descendents) had been in place76.
Due to its geographical position as a Russian exclave surrounded by
EU territory, Kaliningrad remains an extraordinary case. During accession
negotiations Russia insisted on visa-free access to the Russian territory,
a position that lead to conflicts between Russia and the European Union77.
Although facilitated transit regulations78 are in place now, the issue points
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73 European Migration Network, Bulgaria..., op. cit., p. 9.
74 I. Piorko, M. Sie Dhian No, Integrating Poland in the Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice, “European Journal of Migration and Law” 2003, vol. 5, no. 2, p. 194.
75 Ibidem, p. 195.
76 Hence, in 2007 Moldovan applications for Romanian citizenship increased sig-
nificantly. I. Horvath, op. cit., p. 5, 4f.
77 B. Brake, op. cit., p. 7.
78 The Facilitated Travel Document allows for multiple border crossings through
Lithuania, the Facilitated Railway Travel Document for return journeys. The latter is
free of charge, the former accounts for five euro (www.delrus.ec.europa.eu/en/p_575.htm).
to the implications that visa and transit provisions may well have for the
conceptualization of borderlands.
On the other side, visa facilitations or even the relinquishment of visa
requirements can also be observed. One example would be Poland, where
seasonal workers from Belarus, Russia and Ukraine can be employed in
certain sectors without requiring a visa since 200779.
3.2.3. Illegal Migration, Border control and Readmission
– “prevention first!”
It was mainly in the context of accession to the European Union and
the Schengen Area that the need to tighten controls at the eastern bor-
ders increased, thus capacities to effectively guard EU external borders
had to be set up80. Almost all new member states seem to be primarily
engaged with bringing legislation in-line with Schengen requirements,
strengthening border controls and reinforcing measures to prevent
illegal migration81. For instance, during the accession negotiations with
Poland, the issue of border control was pivotal and financial means from
the PHARE program were allocated to Poland in order to strengthen bor-
der controls82. Thus, overall controls are becoming stricter not only driven
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79 OECD, International Migration Outlook..., op. cit., p. 270.
80 The Tampere European Council decided to create an Area of Freedom, Security
and Justice (AFSJ) in 1999 (cf. Council European, Tampere European Council 15 and
16 October 1999. Presidency Conclusions, 1999) including free movement of people
within the Union and measures to control the external border. In 1999 a work program
has been elaborated and transposed by 2004 (for an evaluation see Commission Euro-
pean, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment. Area of Freedom, Security and Justice: Assessment of the Tampere programme
and future orientations, COM(2004) 401 final, Brussels 2004). In the follow-up the
Hague Program set out ten priorities of action, including migration management and
external border control (cf. Commission European, Communication from the Commis-
sion to the Council and the European Parliament. The Hague Programme: Ten priori-
ties for the next five years The Partnership for European renewal in the field of
Freedom, Security and Justice, COM/2005/0184 final, Brussels 2005).
81 On border controls see for instance Slykalikova (V. Slykalikova, op. cit., p. 257)
for Czech Republic, Brake (B. Brake, op. cit., p. 6) for Lithuania, Alscher (S. Alscher,
op. cit., p. 6) for Poland and Horvath (I. Horvath, op. cit., p. 3) for Romania.
82 S. Alscher, op. cit., p. 7.
by the intention to prevent illegal migration but also to combat cross-bor-
der crimes83.
For the purpose of fighting against illegal migration, efforts are being
made to enhance cooperation with third countries. Within the neighbor-
hood policy framework, Lithuania and Austria are assisting Ukraine on
legislative reforms in the ambit of migration84. However, the measures in-
troduced not only focus on preventing illegal migration by enhancing bor-
der protection but also on dealing with illegal migrants already having
entered the country. In 2002, Lithuania augmented the fines for illegal en-
try, exit and transit, including sanctions for people supporting illegal stay,
e.g. by providing work or accommodation85. Similarly, in Poland besides
sanctions, which can be imposed on both employers and employees, for-
eigners working illegally run the risk of expulsion.
Lithuanian readmission agreements have been concluded with several
countries like Moldova or Ukraine86. In this context a significant influence
of European pressure on the one hand and the will to enter of the prospec-
tive member states on the other is observable. So it was demanded of Po-
land that it strengthen readmission and expulsion measures during
accession negotiations87.
3.2.4. Labor Migration – from emigration to immigration policy
Transition and accession to the European Union not only changed
the political environment but also the economic context. Most East and
Central European countries had been experiencing economic growth until
the world economic crisis broke out in late 2008 (see above). Thus, it
is very likely that these changes are reflected in the respective migration
policies.
The Czech Republic’s policy after the breakdown of Soviet Union was
characterized by the opening of borders to all asylum applicants and immi-
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84 B. Brake, op. cit., p. 6.
85 Ibidem.
86 Ibidem.
87 I. Piorko, M. Sie Dhian No, op. cit., p. 184.
grants seeking to enter the country88 and the institutional and legislative
set-up. After a quite successful economic transition, the country entered
an era of economic imbalances around 1997, leading to a more severe mi-
gration policy89. In 2003, migration policy in general turned into a more
active approach, characterized by encouraging legal immigration mainly
of skilled labor while striving to contain illegal migration. In this context,
the pilot project “Active Immigration Policy” was launched in 2003. Ini-
tially including citizens from Bulgaria, Croatia and Kazakhstan, it has
been extended to Belarus and Moldova as of October 2004. Foreigners in-
cluded in the program have the right to apply for permanent residence after
a shortened period compared to the regular application process. Even
though the declared aim of the program is to reduce illegal migration on
the one hand and improve the demographic situation on the other90, the
criteria prospective immigrants have to fulfill (qualification and integra-
tion potential) suggest that there are also economic considerations coming
into play.
Similar patterns can be observed in Poland, where labor migration
in agriculture was facilitated for temporal and seasonal workers from
Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine in 2006. Already in 2004, ac-
cession to the labor market has been facilitated for specified groups like
spouses of Poles. Nevertheless, the overall regulations for access to the la-
bor market are relatively strict91, the protection of Polish workers being
the superior aim. Along with this, in a so-called labor-market-test, em-
ployers have to prove that they have tried to engage a Polish or EU citizen
before having recruited a third state national92.
Likewise, Hungary seems to concentrate primarily on the protection of
the national labor market and the promotion of economic development. As
in the case of Poland, employers aspiring to recruit foreign workers have to
demonstrate their previous intent to engage nationals. Moreover, facilitated
32 Christiane Barnickel, Timm Beichelt SP 4 ’11
88 V. Slykalikova, op. cit., p. 264.
89 D. Drbohlav, op. cit.
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92 A. Kicinger, W. Kloc-Nowak, Combating the Illegal Employment of Foreigners
in the Enlarged European Union: Polish Country Report, in: Addressing the irregular
employment of immigrants in the European Union: between sanctions and rights, eds.
M. Kupiszewski, H. Mattila, International Organization for Migration, Budapest 2008,
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work permits can be issued in certain sectors in case of labor shortages93.
Lithuania as well is developing measures aimed at creating more relaxed
immigration requirements for qualified migrants as well as in shortage
sectors since 2006. Yet, the main aim seems to be to reduce net migration
and for that purpose to promote return migration94. Within the “National
Migration Plan”, adopted in 2004, Romania, amidst other concerns, is try-
ing to manage labor migration. Due to the lack of labor force in certain
sectors (like construction, clothing industry), companies started to recruit
foreign labor, an opening of the labor market can be observed as well95.
In line with European directives 2004/114/EC and 2005/71/EC (both
applying immediately upon adoption) on the admission of third-country
nationals as students and researchers, relaxations of the regular require-
ments to enter the country are in place. The Slovak Republic, for instance,
introduced the provisions in 200796.
3.2.5. Overall Assessment
The overview of the different types of migration policy has revealed
a wide variety of migration measures in the new EU member states. Be-
yond the obvious differences, however, a few main trends seem to be
evolving. They have to be interpreted within the general context of
a (West) European policy oscillation “between measures of ‘integration
and legal immigration’ and ‘repression of illegal immigration’”97. First,
historic legacies appear to significantly impact on migration policies, es-
pecially in terms of return migration. Second, the increasing focus on la-
bor market implications in migration policies – be they restrictive or not
– indicates a shift in the self-concept of CEE countries. The new trend con-
sists in being responsive to economic developments in general and to the
labor market in particular. Third, the increasing fostering of border con-
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trols points to an altered understanding of migration policy, primarily seen
as “migration management before aliens enter the country”98; a tendency
mirroring the western model.
4. Outlook: Rethinking the borderlands character
of Central Eastern Europe
Reflecting on borderlands is an exercise in many dimensions. Of the
available distinctions and categorizations, we refer to a recent one by Da-
vid Newman99. In a recent article, he identified four different foci of bor-
der studies: the focus a) on demarcation and delimitation, b) on binary
distinctions versus networks, c) on the aspect of border crossing, and
d) the identification of peripheral regions as frontiers or transition zones.
In this last section, we will briefly discuss those four dimensions with re-
gard to the ‘traditional’perception of East Central Europe as a borderland.
a) Demarcation, or with other words the drawing of borders, is often seen
as a phenomenon of the past. In the scientific sphere, the insights of
structural linguistics (de Saussure, Foucault, Searle) led to the mainst-
ream position that many real world phenomena are constructed. Whe-
reas nations were widely regarded as firm entities during the 19th and
20th centuries, we today know that they can be seen as “invented” or
“imagined”100. The process of invention does not completely depend
on the activity of cultural entrepreneurs, but is closely connected to so-
cial developments and the context in which they occur101. As a con-
sequence, most authors in several scientific disciplines – like, for
example, anthropology, sociology, or history – would only very re-
luctantly place processes of demarcation at the center of their interest.
On the other hand, real-world developments of the early 21st century
indicate that demarcation and border creation play a significant role for
migration flows. East Central and South Eastern Europe are indeed
particularly well suited world regions to illustrate the significance
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of border drawings. We are dealing with a region in which more than
a dozen new states were created after 1989/1991102; many of them with
the intention to halt migration developments that were not judged legit-
imate by majority populations. Furthermore, the process of European
integration has, beyond any doubt, built up new societal walls where
state borders had started to lose a part of their significance. For exam-
ple, the new EU border and particularly the Schengen regime have cut
societal linkages with regard to family or work migration. Particularly
Ukraine and all Yugoslav successor states, except for Slovenia, had to
suffer from this development. Altogether therefore, the region of East
Central Europe can serve as a primary example for the general trend of
borderland studies to dismiss the category of demarcation as a “tradi-
tionalist or, at worst, […] determinist” practice103.
b) Should the borders East of East Central Europe be seen as binary di-
stinctions or in the context of larger networks? Distinctions offered by
Newman consist in “here-there, us-them, include-exclude, self-other,
inside-outside”104. Sections 2+3 of this text have shown that East Cen-
tral Europe’s position within such distinctions has changed in recent
years. A traditionally remote European region has been redefined from
an outer to an inner borderland of Greater Europe. Various instruments
of identity creation – from European “culture capitals” over student ex-
change programs to an official fostering of language diversity in EU
institutions – create signals of belonging. The border between inclu-
sion and exclusion has been pushed eastwards: whereas waiting lines
for obtaining a “European” visa were previously a phenomenon of
West European embassies in Warsaw or Prague, the same is now the
case in Moscow and Kiev.
However, it is not completely clear yet if we will in the end be dealing
with pure dislocation or with the evolution of a larger set of networks.
The inclusion of many Ukrainians in the low skilled labor market of
new member states may serve as one example to illustrate functional
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needs for social interaction across the new Eastern border. In the intel-
lectual sphere, artists like the Ukrainian writer Yuri Andrukhovych or
his Polish colleague Andrzej Stasiuk undertake major efforts to con-
struct areas of inclusion that transgress the borders of the current EU.
The great resonance they find beyond their national audiences shows
that the delineation processes that began after the fall of the iron cur-
tain are still under way.
c) The perception of border crossings is to be seen in a similar perspec-
tive. Are borders usually crossed into one direction, or do they rather
serve as crossings into two (or more) directions? The experience of the
Oder River between Germany and Poland may serve as an instructive
example. During the cold war and the first subsequent years, the border
– which mostly runs through the river – was usually identified as a ma-
jor dividing line between East and West. Later, things changed completely.
Linked to politically correct actions in order to facilitate German-Po-
lish reconciliation, the Oder River is today seen as the opposite of
a dividing line, namely a cultural construct linking historical landsca-
pes105. The same might happen to the Bug River, the Black Sea, or even
the Bosporus106.
Accordingly, the different types of migrant border crossings at the
edges of Europe are often interpreted in contradicting terms107. On the
one hand, the border divides local interaction. On the other, activities
to resolve the practical difficulties created by the border may lead to in-
tensified cooperation. One example beyond East Central Europe would
be the Spanish enclaves in Morocco, Ceuta and Melilla. On the one
hand, the fences and intense use of border surveillance technologies
are a perfect example for the materialization of the ‘fortress Europe’.
On the other, increasing cooperation between Spain and Morocco can
be observed, for instance in judicial issues concerning inter-ethnic
marriages108. The point is reflected in those Schengen regulations
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which are designed for people from neighboring regions, which under
certain circumstances are allowed to enter on daily basis mainly for
work purposes109. The example illustrates that it often depends on exo-
genous framing processes if a frontier is assessed by its dividing force
or by elements of cross-border cooperation. Even extreme examples
leave open space for contingent interpretation. Ceuta and Melilla may
underline the fortress metaphor, but can at the same time be assessed as
a territory with a semi-permeable or selectively open border110.
d) Lastly, we should not forget that East Central Europe continues to be
a place of economic and political transition. As such, many societal
borders have to be crossed in everyday life, and material frontiers be-
tween states appear within broader sets of obstacles to individuals.
A borderland tradition may in such a context well develop into an asset
– a mentality to cope with given problems by reaching out into areas
beyond traditional action patterns. In that sense, the transformation
from an outer to an inner borderland is not without risks. The flexibility
of individuals to constantly react to unexpected developments may di-
minish. In some economic sectors, jobs in Germany have first been ta-
ken over by Polish migrants, then moved to Poland and then been taken
over by Ukrainian migrants. A transition or borderland character is not
inscribed to a region forever, and East Central Europe is undergoing
a thorough image change. However, ascending out of an alleged ‘bac-
kwardness’ does not automatically lead to a social reality in which pe-
ripheral aspects do not exist any more. Rather, the perception of
a region’s “peripherality”111 depends to a large extent on dominant fra-
mes in ever fluid interpretation patterns.
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Zmiana granic w Europie Œrodkowo-Wschodniej?
Wzorce migracji i reakcje polityczne
Streszczenie
Celem tekstu jest przedstawienie zagadnienia migracji do Europy Œrodkowo-
-Wschodniej oraz polityki migracyjnej, prowadzonej przez nowe pañstwa cz³onkowskie
UE, z wykorzystaniem pojêcia pogranicza. Koncentracja na granicach i obszarach,
jakie te granice dziel¹ pozwala uwzglêdniæ now¹ perspektywê naukow¹, znajduj¹c¹
wyraz w nowych terminach, takich jak „topograficzny” i „przestrzenny.”
Tekst ma zatem podwójny cel. Z jednej strony usi³uje przeœledziæ i wyjaœniæ ruchy
migracyjne powoduj¹ce nap³yw oraz odp³yw imigrantów z nowych pañstw cz³on-
kowskich UE oraz reakcje tych¿e pañstw. Z drugiej stawia pytanie, co te ruchy
ludnoœciowe mówi¹ nam na temat Europy Œrodkowo-Wschodniej jako pogranicza
w nowym, ewoluuj¹cym systemie politycznym UE.
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Aby zrealizowaæ te dwa cele zastosowano metaforyczne pojêcie pogranicza. Nie
posiada ono ustalonej definicji. Stosuje siê je raczej dla okreœlenia ró¿nych zjawisk
zwi¹zanych z pograniczem, takich jak otwartoœæ b¹dŸ zamkniêcie granic, inten-
sywnoœæ wzajemnych relacji pomiêdzy obiema stronami granicy, ró¿norodny rozwój
po obu stronach, polityczne i spo³eczne podejœcie do granic w szerszej polityce
dotycz¹cej granic. W zwi¹zku z tym, zagadnienia pogranicza nie mo¿na po prostu
sprowadziæ do kwestii napiêæ pomiêdzy granicami otwartymi a bezpiecznymi.
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